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Abstract 
This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are 
call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete 
in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to 
charge low access prices. This result moderates the risk of tacit collusion when competitors can 
freely negotiate their access charges. We also analyze the case of a merger between the two 
networks and give conditions under which the merger can be welfare improving. 
 
 
 
Résumé 
Cet article examine un modèle de deux réseaux de qualités différentes interconnectés. Il existe 
des externalités d’appels dans le sens où les consommateurs valorisent les appels qu’ils émettent 
et également ceux qu’ils recoivent. Les réseaux se font concurrence en tarif binôme. Nous 
montrons que les externalités d’appels créent des incitations privées pour chaque réseau à facturer 
l’accès à son réseau à un prix bas. Ce résultat modère le risque de collusion tacite lorsque les 
opérateurs preuvent négocier librement les prix d’accès qu’ils se facturent. Nous étudions 
également le cas d’une fusion entre les deux opérateurs et donnons les conditions sous lesquelles 
la fusion améliore le bien-être. 
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1 Introduction
Analyzing telecommunications liberalization naturally leads to separate the
analysis of two dynamic phases. During the transitory stage following the
opening to competition, the incumbent’s network represents an essential
facility for new competitors. The main risk of anti-competitive practices is
then concerned by the abuse of dominant position which could conduct to
the new competitors’ foreclosure. Access pricing in this framework has given
rise to numerous papers over the last few years1. The telecommunication
sector will enter a mature phase once competitors will have developed a
suﬃciently large geographic coverage allowing them to connect ﬁnal users
directly. This is the case in mobile telecommunications. This will arise in
the ﬁxed link network when the local loop will be eﬀectively competitive2.
Nevertheless, networks will continue to be interconnected in order to keep
the advantages of network externalities. In this context, the main risk of
anti-competitive practices will probably reside in tacit collusion. Recent
literature on this issue (Armstrong (1998), Laﬀont, Rey, Tirole (1998a,b),
Carter and Wright (1999)) shows that interconnected network providers may
collude tacitly through high access charges.
New telecommunication providers will try naturally to diﬀerentiate their
products in order to segment the market and to lower competition. This dif-
ferentiation can have horizontal or a vertical dimension. Telecommunication
services of diﬀerent qualities can be oﬀered. For example, a mobile telecom-
munication network can be considered of a higher quality than a ﬁxed link
network. Consumers can call and be called at any period in the day.
When consumers can adopt only one network, two kinds of calls have
to be distinguished: calls between consumers of the same network (”on-net
calls”) and calls destined to the rival network (”oﬀ-net calls”). Oﬀ-net calls
give rise to the payment of an access charge to the destined network. This
distinction leads to study two regulatory questions.
First, does price discrimination between on-net and oﬀ-net calls have
to be authorized by regulatory agencies ? Such price discrimination is for
example in practice for calls between ﬁxed link and mobile networks or
even between same quality networks3. This kind of pricing’s goal is to
1For a survey on this literature, see for example Armstrong (2002).
2The local loop unbundling remains very heterogeneous between countries and does
not allow a perfect competition on this market today (Baranes-Gassot[2002]).
3This is the case for example for the friends and family programs.
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create bandwagon eﬀects in order for price discrimination to restore tariﬀ-
mediated network externalities despite interconnection. Indeed, the higher
the number of consumers adopting a network, the higher is the probability
for a call to be on-net. This reduces the total cost for consumers if on-net
calls are priced lower than oﬀ-net calls. A complementary question concerns
the receiver payer principle.
Second, can public authorities let competitors freely negotiate their ac-
cess prices or is there a need for regulation at least in a transitory regime ?
An intermediate solution consists in imposing a reciprocity principle. This
rule has the advantage to be easily veriﬁable by regulatory agencies.
Recent literature has focussed on the possible anticompetitive use of ac-
cess charges between interconnected networks. Armstrong (1998) and Laf-
font, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show that high access prices conduct to a ’rais-
ing each other cost eﬀect’ in a linear pricing context and when providers can-
not price discriminate between on-net and oﬀ-net calls. This eﬀect partially
or totally disappears when providers can operate a price discrimination be-
tween on-net and oﬀ-net calls (Laﬀont et al.(1998b)) or when they compete
in non-linear prices (Laﬀont et al. (1998a)). In those two cases, providers
use one tool to compete in market shares and one tool to maximize their
access revenue. The collusive power of access charges totally disappears in
two part tariﬀs. The positive eﬀect of higher access charges on retail prof-
its is totally neutralized by a lower ﬁxed fee. In a recent paper, Dessein
(2002) shows that this proﬁt neutrality result is robust to the introduction
of customer heterogeneity on demand volumes, but is not when subscription
is elastic. In the latter case, there exist network externalities. The ’rais-
ing each other cost’ eﬀect is reversed : lower access charges decreases usage
prices which increases participation rate. This creates a virtuous circle since
it enhances attractiveness for new subscribers (network externality eﬀect)
and then increases the fee that providers can charge. Firms then collude
through low access charges. Gans and King (2001) show that when they
compete in non linear pricing and when they can price discriminate between
on-net and oﬀ-net calls, providers collude through low access charges.
In this paper, we introduce two new components. First, networks are
asymmetric by their quality and compete in non linear pricing. They also
choose freely the level of their access charge. Consumer’s demand depends
on the quality of the network they adopt. This leads to the introduction of
heterogeneity on demand volumes. Second, consumers do not only value the
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number of calls they send but also the number they receive. Before taking
his adoption decision, a consumer compares the price he pays for his commu-
nications and the prices the other pay for calling him. This is at the origin
of call externalities. Little theoretical work has been realized on network
competition with call externalities. Hermalin and Katz (2002) distinguish
one-way and two-way calling patterns. In the former, only one party can
initiate communication or exchange whereas in the latter both parties can
do so. Hahn (2000), Wright (2002), Jeon et al. (2002), Kim and Lim (2001)
examine retail pricing in the presence of call externalities in a one-way call-
ing framework. Hermalin and Katz (2002) study a two-way calling model.
They allow positive reception prices or the payer receiver principle (Jeon
et al. (2002) and Kim and Lim (2001) also examine this principle but in
a one-way calling model). Even if it can be welfare enhancing, this is not
a common practice in most network competition. In this paper, we use a
two-way calling model but we do not allow for such positive receive price.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we shed a new light on the
debate over collusive concern of high access charges. We determine equi-
librium pricing with call externalities. We show that providers internalize
on-net calls externalities on their own network, but do not for oﬀ-net calls.
However, by choosing freely his access charge, a provider can internalize oﬀ-
net call externalities for its consumers. As a result, he can charge low access
prices, even below marginal cost, since it increases utility of its consumers
and allows him to charge higher ﬁxed fees. We show that the (non recip-
rocal) access charge maximizing his proﬁt is lower than the cost he bears
for terminating calls if his network is relatively small. This corresponds to
an implicit subsidy of received calls, against sent calls. However, providers
lack instruments and the competitive level of access charge is too high be-
cause of a double marginalization eﬀect. Nevertheless, this eﬀect allows us
to moderate the risks of tacit collusion when competitors can freely nego-
tiate their access charges. Second, we bring new arguments to the debate
over the optimal design market in telecommunications and more generally
in the ICT industry. We show precisely in this paper that a more concen-
trated industry can improve welfare. Merging the two telecommunications
providers solves the call externalities distortion.. We show that the merger
does not aﬀect the on-net calls price on the high quality network whereas
it increases the on-net calls price on the low quality network. Oﬀ-net prices
in both directions are decreased. The merger increases inter network traﬃc.
This positive eﬀect is a positive eﬃciency eﬀect of the merger which must
be put in balance with the traditional competition reduction eﬀect. From a
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normative point of view, the merger does not aﬀect consumers surplus on
the low quality network whereas it improves the situation of consumers on
the high quality network (and the global welfare) if they are in high enough
proportion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 is dedicated to network competition. We solve the two stage game in
which providers ﬁrst choose simultaneously their access charge and then
compete in non linear tariﬀs. Section 4 analyses the merger between the
two providers. We compute tariﬀs of the private monopoly resulting from
the merger and conduce the welfare analysis. The last section oﬀers some
conclusive remarks.
2 The model
We consider two interconnected networks of diﬀerent quality. The highest
(lowest) quality is denoted q1 (q2). For example a mobile telecommunication
network is considered of higher quality than a ﬁxed link network, since it
allows mobility. Fixed link networks can also be of diﬀerent qualities espe-
cially in the case of national interconnected telecommunications networks
or in the diﬀerent components of the Internet. In a general manner, the
quality of a network results from the quality of transmission infrastructures,
the procedures of traﬃc re-routing in case of congested networks, or from
more qualitative aspects as the quality of relations with consumers.
The marginal cost of a communication on network i is assumed to be
constant and is decomposed in the following way : a cost for originating
and terminating calls, both equal to ci. The cost in between is normalized
to zero. We assume that the ﬁxed cost for serving a consumer is fi for
network i. Each provider has only to bear directly the costs on his network.
For a communication between network j and i, ﬁrm i bears a cost ci for
terminating the call and in return bills an access price ai to provider j. The
total cost of an on-net call on network i is thus 2ci, while the cost of an
oﬀ-net call on network i is ci + aj , with i 9= j. We allow ai 9= aj, which
means that we do not impose a reciprocity principle.
Competitors can price discriminate between on-net and oﬀ-net calls.
Each of them proposes a two part tariﬀ where Fi is the fee for a consumer
adopting network i. The unit price of an on-net call on network i is pi
whereas the one of a call originated on network i and terminated on net-
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work j is pˆi. Consumers only pay the calls they send
4 and are supposed
to subscribe only to one network. Furthermore, we assume no information
asymmetries on costs and demand conditions.
We consider a vertical diﬀerentiation model a` la Mussa & Rosen [1978].
Consumers heterogeneity, represented by parameter θ, characterizes the will-
ingness to pay for quality. We assume that the more consumers value the
quality of communications, the higher is the utility they derive and the more
is their willingness to pay for that service. This heterogeneity can also be
derived from an income disparity. Consumers with a higher income are dis-
posed to pay more for a higher telecommunication service quality. We limit
the analysis to two types of consumers noted θ and θ (θ<θ). Total popula-
tion is normalized to 1 and is divided exogenously in proportion α of type
θ and (1− α) of type θ.
The utility derived by a consumer adopting a network depends on the
quality of the network, the number of calls he can send and the number of
calls he receives. Given quantity of calls (sent or received) x, a consumer θ
joining network i has utility Uθi (x) = θqiW (x), where W (.) is assumed to
be non decreasing and concave.
We easily derive demand functions for a consumer θ adopting a network
of quality qi, at price p. These are solutions of xθi(p) = argmax
{x}
{Uθi(x)−px}.
Therefore, indirect utility for a consumer θ¯ sending xθi(p) calls is Uθi(xθi (p))
and the one for receiving xθj (p) calls is Uθi(xθj (p)).
We have the following properties
xθ1(p) > xθ2(p) ∀θ = θ, θ
xθi(p) > xθi(p) ∀i = 1, 2 (1)
Proof. xθ¯i(p) is given by U

θi
(xθi(p)) = θqiW
(xθi(p)) = p and xθi(p) by
U θi(xθi(p)) = θqiW
(xθi(p)) = p.
We then have θqiW (xθi(p)) = θqiW
(xθi(p)). As θ > θ, this equality
is possible iﬀ W (xθi(p)) < W
(xθi(p)). As W
 < 0, we derive xθi(p) >
xθi(p).
These two properties have an intuitive interpretation. Demand of indi-
viduals increases with respect to the quality of the good. Therefore, for a
4See Jeon, Laﬀont, Tirole (2002) or Hermalin and Katz (2002) on the receiver pays
principle.
5
given price, a consumer θ sends more calls when he adopts a high quality
network. Similarly, for a given quantity, demand increases with respect to
consumer’s willingness to pay. Therefore, for the same network quality, a
consumer θ sends more calls than a consumer θ.
We assume, as in most of the existing literature on networks interconnec-
tion, an isotropic or balanced calling pattern. This means that if a propor-
tion α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of consumers adopt network 1 and (1−α) network 2, the
probability for a call originated on network 1 to be terminated on the same
network is α and on the network 2 is (1 − α). Under the isotropic calling
pattern assumption, if all consumers have the same demand functions and
prices are the same on the two networks, then traﬃc ﬂows between the two
networks are the same5.
As already pointed out by Laﬀont, Rey, Tirole (1998), price discrimina-
tion between on-net and oﬀ-net calls restores tariﬀ-mediated network exter-
nalities. The utility derived from joining one of the two networks depends
on the number of consumers on this network, as this determines the propor-
tion of on-net and oﬀ-net calls. The more consumers subscribe to the same
network, the higher is the proportion of on-net calls. If the price for on-net
calls is lower than it is for oﬀ-net calls, then the higher the number of con-
sumers in the same network, the more they send and receive calls. Network
externalities induce a coordination problem between consumers who have
to make conjectures on the others consumers’ behavior. We use a rational
expectation concept and at equilibrium those conjectures are correct.
In this paper, we focus only on situations where high type consumers (θ)
adopt the high quality network and low type consumers (θ) adopt the low
quality network. In other words, we do not examine the pooling case where
both types of consumers coordinate on the same network.
Under these assumptions, if all consumers θ coordinate on network 1,
then their individual utility for sending calls is given by:
V sθ1(p1, pˆ1) = α[Uθ1(xθ1(p1))− p1xθ1(p1)] + (1− α)[Uθ1(xθ1(pˆ1))− pˆ1xθ1(pˆ1)]
(2)
Utility for consumers θ adopting network 2 for sending calls is:
V sθ2(p2, pˆ2) = (1− α)[Uθ2(xθ2(p2))− p2xθ2(p2)] + α[Uθ2(xθ2(pˆ2))− pˆ2xθ2(pˆ2)]
5See Dessein (2002) for non balanced traﬃc models.
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In order to determine the valuation for received calls, we assume that if a
proportion α (respectively 1 − α) of consumers adopt network 1 (resp. 2),
each consumer receives 1/α (resp. 1/(1 − α)) of the total ﬂow terminated
on his network. The valuation of received calls is then given by:
V rθ1(p1, pˆ2) = αUθ1(xθ1(p1)) + (1− α)Uθ1(xθ2(pˆ2)) (3)
V rθ2(p2, pˆ1) = (1− α)Uθ2(xθ2(p2)) + αUθ2(xθ1(pˆ1))
We can now write the total indirect utility for a consumer θ or θ depending
on the network he chooses to adopt. We make at this stage the following
assumption
Vθi(pi , pˆi, pˆj, Fi) = V
s
θi(pi , pˆi) + V
r
θi(pi , pˆj)− Fi
= vθi − Fi
This assumption means that consumers have the same valuation for the
calls they send and receive. On net and oﬀ-net calls are supposed to be non
substitutable and utility is separable and additive between sent and received
calls. Note also that the utility of consumer θ on network i depends not
only on the prices (pi, pˆi) he pays for sending calls, but also on prices other
consumers pay to call him (pi, pˆj). This last term is at the origin of call
externalities.
We also need to write the indirect utility of a consumer who switches
unilaterally to the other network. Ceteris paribus, consumer θ who deviates
on network 2 has an indirect utility
Vθ2(p2, pˆ2, pˆ1, F2) = (1− α) [Uθ2(xθ2(p2)) + Uθ2(xθ2(p2))− p2xθ2(p2)]
+α[Uθ2(xθ2(ep2)) + Uθ2(xθ1(ep1))− ep2xθ2(ep2)]− F2
= vθ2 − F2 (4)
while a consumer θ who deviates on network 1 receives an indirect utility
Vθ1(p1, pˆ1, pˆ2, F1) = α[Uθ1(xθ1(p1)) + Uθ1(xθ1(p1))− p1xθ1(p1)]
+(1− α)[Uθ1(xθ1(pˆ1)) + Uθ1(xθ2(ep2))− pˆ1xθ1(pˆ1)]− F1
= vθ1 − F1 (5)
At this stage, we can write the constraints which need to be veriﬁed in order
to respect the allocation of each type of consumers on each network. Namely,
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each type of consumer has to verify incentive and individual rationality
constraints. Consumers θ adopt network 1 iﬀ
Vθ1(p1, pˆ1, pˆ2, F1) ≥ Vθ2(p2, pˆ2, pˆ1, F2)
⇔ (vθ1 − F1) ≥ (vθ2 − F2) (IC1)
and
(vθ1 − F1) ≥ 0 (IR1)
Consumer θ adopts network 2 iﬀ:
Vθ2(p2, pˆ1, pˆ2, F2) ≥ Vθ1(p1, pˆ2, pˆ1, F1)
⇔ vθ2 − F2 ≥ vθ1 − F1 (IC2) (6)
and
vθ2 − F2 ≥ 0 (IR2)
We can now write proﬁt on networks 1 and 2 if (6), (6), (IR1) and (IR2)
hold:
Π1(p1, pˆ1, F1) = α2(p1 − 2c1)xθ1(p1) + α(1− α)(pˆ1 − c1 − a2)xθ1(pˆ1)
+α(1− α)(a1 − c1)xθ2(pˆ2)− f1 + F1
= α(π1 − f1 + F1) (7)
Π2(p2, pˆ2, F2) = (1− α)2(p2 − 2c2)xθ2(p2) + α(1− α)(pˆ2 − c2 − a1)xθ2(pˆ2)
+α(1− α)(a2 − c2)xθ1(pˆ1)− f2 + F2
= (1− α)(π2 − f2 + F2) (8)
3 Network Competition
In this section we examine a competitive network market where the two
diﬀerent providers compete in the following game. In a ﬁrst stage, they
choose simultaneously their access charge. In a second stage, they compete
simultaneously in two part tariﬀs. We ﬁrst derive the tariﬀ competition
equilibrium and then discuss the decentralized choices of access charges.
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3.1 Tariﬀ competition
Let us assume that provider 1 operates the high quality network and provider
2 operates the low quality network. We only focus on a duopoly equilibrium
where consumers θ adopt network 1 and consumers θ adopt network 2. Both
providers set the fee and prices for on net and oﬀ-net calls maximizing their
proﬁt. As in standard adverse selection models, they are constrained by an
individual rationality constraint (IRi) and incentive constraint an (ICi) of
consumers. Equilibrium prices (pi, pˆi, Fi ) for provider i are solutions of the
following program:
(pi, pˆi, Fi) = arg max
{pi,pˆi,Fi}
Πi(pi, pˆi, Fi) = αi(πi + Fi − fi)
s.t. :
vθi − Fi ≥ 0 (IRi)
vθi − Fi − vθj + Fj ≥ 0 (ICi)
with πi = αi(pi − 2ci)xθi(pi) + (1−αi)(epi − (ci+ aj))xθi(epi) + (1−αi)(ai−
ci)xθj (epj)
αi is the proportion of consumers on network i. The resolution of this
program is not standard as we are not guaranteed that incentives constraints
are compatible. Both providers choose their calls prices and the ﬁxed fee
they charge to consumers. We denote (p, pˆ) = (p1, p2, pˆ1, pˆ2). The unique
duopoly equilibrium candidate for the competition in ﬁxed fees is such that
the individual rationality constraint of consumers θ subscribed to network 2
(IR2) and incentive constraint of consumers θ subscribed to network 1 (IC1)
are binding. Thus for a unique duopoly equilibrium candidate, program for
ﬁrm 1 writes
max
{p1,pˆ1}
Π1(p, pˆ, F1) = α
k
π1 + vθ1 −

vθ2 − vθ2

− f1
l
and for ﬁrm 2
max
{p2,pˆ2}
Π2(p, pˆ, F2) = (1− α)

π2 + vθ2 − f2

Let us deﬁne function Ψ as:
vθ1 − vθ1 ≥ vθ2 − vθ2 ⇔ Ψ (p, pˆ) ≥ 0
The following proposition gives equilibrium prices.
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Proposition 1 (i) if Ψ

pd, pˆd

≥ 0, there exists a unique duopoly tariﬀ
equilibrium with
pd1 = c1, p
d
2 = c2, epd2 = c2 + a1 and
epd1 =
+
(1−α)θq1
(1−α)θq1−α(θ−θ)q2
(c1 + a2) if
α
1−α <
θq1
(θ−θ)q2
+∞ otherwise
F d1 and F
d
2 are given by the binding constraints : (IR2) and (IC1)
(ii) Otherwise, there does not exist any equilibrium.
Proof : see appendix 1
Recall that marginal costs for on-net and oﬀ-net calls on network i are
respectively 2ci and c1 + c2. Unit on-net prices are exactly half of marginal
cost on both networks. This comes from call externalities : each call is
valued not only by the sender but also by the receiver. Providers fully in-
ternalize those externalities for on-net calls. Decreasing unit price enhances
subscribers’ utility and allows to charge a higher ﬁxed fee. Recall that the
valuation of (received or sent) calls depends on the type of consumers and
on the quality of the network. An on-net call has the same value for the
sender and for the receiver, as both are of the same type and adopt the same
network. Hence, on-net calls are charged at half the marginal cost.
This is not the same for oﬀ-net call externalities. The utility surplus
derived by a consumer on the opposite network from receiving oﬀ-net calls
cannot be captured by the provider. This induces a distortion in usage
prices. Moreover, the nature of the distortion is diﬀerent on the two networks
according to binding constraints. If the relative size of network 1 ( α1−α) is
relatively small, the price of an oﬀ-net call on network 1 needs to be relatively
low. Such a price limits the attractiveness of network 2. Proposition 1
indicates that the oﬀ-net calls price on network 1 is higher than the marginal
cost ( c1+a2). This comes from negative externalities through oﬀ-net calls.
Indeed, a diminution of oﬀ-net calls price of network 1 ep1 has two opposite
eﬀects on the incentive constraint of a consumer θ. First, it increases the
number of oﬀ-net calls he sends if he stays on network 1 and then increases
vθ1 . Second, it increases the number of oﬀ-net calls he should receive from
network 1 users if he switches to network 2 and then increases vθ2 . In
all cases, the latter eﬀect increases ep1. If the relative size of network 1 is
high enough

α
1−α >
θq1
(θ−θ)q2

, calling consumers θ on network 2 does not
matter. A very high level of oﬀ-net calls prices on network 1 ep1 relaxes the
incentive constraint and it is optimal for provider 1 to annihilate the oﬀ-
net ﬂow terminating on the other network. This is the case of connectivity
breakdown, already noted by Jeon, Laﬀont Tirole (2002). Conversely, if
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the relative size of network 1 is small enough

α
1−α <
θq1
(θ−θ)q2

, the ﬁrst
eﬀect has a signiﬁcant weight and the provider gains to authorize outside
communication for its consumers.
Finally, oﬀ-net calls price on the low quality network ( epd2 ) is equal
to the marginal cost (c2 + a1). As (IC2) is not binding, there is no such
distortion coming from the incentive for consumers to switch to the compet-
itive network. It is also interesting to note that the low quality network is
never better oﬀ cutting communication with the higher quality competitive
network.
3.2 Competitive access prices
In this section we solve the ﬁrst stage of the game. Both providers choose
simultaneously their access charge. The goal of this section is to discuss the
collusive power of access charges.
In most of this literature, authors impose a reciprocity principle, i.e.
a1 = a2 = a. This assumption has important implications in the comparative
static analysis with respect to the access charge. Indeed, increasing the
access charge does not only raise the rival’s cost but also its own cost. This
assumption is the key of the ’raising each other’s cost’ eﬀect in Armstrong
(1998) or in Laﬀont, Rey, Tirole (1998a,b)6. In our paper, we do not impose
this assumption. A provider can raise its rival’s cost without raising its own
cost. This point is also an important regulatory issue.
In this section, we bring a new light on the risk of use of high access
charges for collusive concerns. Indeed, the level of access charge will inﬂu-
ence the level of oﬀ-net calls prices. As in the existing literature, it has an
impact on the number of calls consumers will send. But the level of access
charges has also an impact on the number of oﬀ-net calls consumers will re-
ceive. The latter eﬀect acts on call externalities and we show that providers
can reduce ineﬃciencies on call externalities when they can choose freely
their access charge.
We determine the access charges maximizing providers’ proﬁt. At duopoly
competitive tariﬀ equilibrium, the proﬁt of operator i is continue with re-
spect to access charge and can be written as :
Πi(ai, aj) = αi(πi(ai, aj) + F di (ai, aj)− fi)
Proﬁt depends on the access charge through two terms : the access revenue
which writes ARi = (ai − ci)xθj (pˆj (ai)) and the fee F di the provider can
6LRT (1998a) also discuss non reciprocal access charges.
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charge at competitive equilibrium. We derive the optimal access charge for
the two components and for both providers.
Provider 1 :
At competitive equilibrium, provider 1 binds the incentive constraint and
has to give consumers an incentive rent which depends on the access charge.
By diﬀerentiating F d1 with respect to a1 we obtain:
dF d1
da1
=
dvθ1
da1
−
d(vθ2−vθ2)
da1
=
∂vθ1
∂ep2
−
∂(vθ2−vθ2)
∂ep2

depd2
da1
=

(1− α)θq1θq2
ep2
dxθ2
dep2
+ α(xθ2 − xθ2)

depd2
da1
An increase in access charge to network 1 leads to two opposite eﬀects on fee
F1: a receiving calls eﬀect and a sending calls eﬀect. First, a higher access
charge decreases the utility of network 1 since consumers receive fewer calls
from network 2 users. This is the negative receiving calls eﬀect represented
by the ﬁrst term between brackets. Second, a higher access charge decreases
the incentive to switch on-network 2 since consumers should pay more to
send oﬀ-net calls. This is the positive sending calls eﬀect represented by
the double term between brackets. It is straightforward to show that F ∗1 is
ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing with respect to a1. Note that the access
charge maximizing the ﬁxed fee F d1 is independent of c1. In other words, the
price maximizing the subscription fee for terminating a call is independent
of its marginal cost.
The access revenue for provider 1 writes
AR1 = (1− α) (a1 − c1)xθ2

epd2(a1)

and is concave with respect to a1. The access charge maximizing the access
revenue is clearly above the marginal cost c1. Remark that the maximization
of the access revenue yields to a double marginalization problem. Note
also that both access charge maximizing the subscription fee and the access
revenue are independent of a2.
Provider 2 :
At competitive equilibrium, provider 2 binds the individual rationality
constraint for low type consumers. Diﬀerentiating F d2 with respect to a2
yields
dF d2
da2
=
dvθ2
da2
=
∂vθ2
∂ep1
dep1
da2
= αθq2
θq1
epd1
dxθ1
dep1
dep1
da2
< 0
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Since only the individual rationality constraint is binding at equilibrium,
provider 2 faces only a receiving calls eﬀect. The higher its access charge,
the less its consumers will receive calls from network 1’s consumers, the
lower is their utility and the lower is the fee he can charge. The subscription
fee F d2 is then always decreasing with its access charge a2. As for provider 1,
the access revenue is concave with respect to the access charge. The access
charge maximizing the access revenue is clearly above the marginal cost. As
for provider 1, it is independent of the rival’s access charge.
The following proposition summarizes those results for both providers.
Proposition 2

ad1, a
d
2

are equilibrium solutions of the simultaneous game
of choice of access charges.
i) Access charge to network 1 is above the marginal cost for terminating
calls (ad1 > c1) iﬀ α1−α > α
ii) Access charge to network 2 is above the marginal cost for terminating
calls (ad2 > c2) iﬀ α1−α < α
where α = xθ2(xθ2−xθ2 )

θq1
θq2
1
ξxθ2
− 1

, α =

θq1
θq2 − ξxθ1

θ
(θ−θ) and
ξxθi = −
dxθi
depi
epi
xθi

ai=ci
is the price elasticity of demand for consumers θ
computed for access charge ai equal to marginal cost ci.
Proof : see appendix 2
The decentralized choice of the access charge by providers leads to two
opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, it induces a double marginalization prob-
lem on oﬀ-net prices. Each provider charges a price for oﬀ-net calls : the
sending provider through the usage price and the receiving provider through
the access charge. This creates an incentive to increase access charges. On
the other hand, as providers use two part tariﬀs, they can capture a part
of their consumer surplus. If surplus is decreasing with respect to usage
prices, this creates an incentive not to charge too high access charge. More
precisely, each call sent by a customer generates a call externality for the
receiver. We have shown in the previous section that each provider inter-
nalizes those call externalities for on-net calls on its own network. As a
result unit prices for on-net calls are half the marginal cost because call ex-
ternalities within networks are not internalized. Unit oﬀ-net calls prices do
not take into account the call externality. However, those prices depend on
the access charge for terminating calls. By choosing freely its access charge,
a provider can inﬂuence oﬀ-net calls unit prices. In other words, choosing
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freely its access charge allows him to internalize oﬀ-net call externalities.
He can thus reduce the distortion due to externalities. Note that there sub-
sists a distortion since each provider faces a trade-oﬀ between maximizing
the subscription fee and the access revenue. Access charge is then only one
tool for many objectives. More precisely, the optimal access charge for each
provider depends on the binding constraint at tariﬀ equilibrium.
Provider 2’s subscription fee only depends on the call externalities. Close
to marginal cost c2, an increase in the access charge a2 enhances the ac-
cess revenue but decreases the subscription fee provider 2 can charge. The
equilibrium access charge to network 2 is above marginal cost if enough con-
sumers choose network 2 relatively to those on the rival’s network (α/ (1− α)).
Provider 1’s subscription fee does not only depend on call externalities
but also on the incentive rent (vθ2 − vθ2) he has to give to its consumers.
When choosing its access charge a1, provider 1 has only one instrument for
three objectives : reducing the incentive rent, internalizing call externalities
and maximizing its access revenue. It is easy to verify that
d(vθ2
−vθ2)
dpˆ2
< 0.
An increase in the access charge increases the oﬀ-net price which decreases
the incentive rent. If the proportion of consumers on network 2 is high, cus-
tomers on network 1 receive an important proportion of calls from network
2 (oﬀ-net calls). Provider 1 gains to charge a low access charge below the
marginal cost, even if it implies an access deﬁcit. The access deﬁcit is com-
pensated by higher subscriptions revenues. Remark also that the threshold
α¯ is decreasing with the price elasticity of demand for low type consumers
on network 2 ξxθ2 . The lower ξxθ2 , the more provider 1 charges an access
charge below marginal cost.
Our results have important implications from a regulatory or compe-
tition policy point of view. Access charges can be used as a tool of tacit
collusion by the ’raise each other’s cost eﬀect’ (or the double marginalization
eﬀect). Access charges are also a tool for both providers to internalize call
externalities. The latter eﬀect counterbalances the former and contributes
to moderate the risk of collusive power of access charges. It speaks for a
decentralized and free determination of access charges level by providers.
Note also that a regulation of access charges taking into account such call
externalities eﬀects does not seem realistic in terms of informational require-
ments.
As in all externalities problems, one solution to annihilate distortion is to
merge parties. In the following section, we address the question of merging
telecommunication operators.
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4 Mergers analysis
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of a merger between the two networks.
Traditionally, a merger leads to two opposite eﬀects : a decrease in com-
petition in the market and possible eﬃciency gains. Literature on mergers
and antitrust authorities practices focus on costs reduction (see e.g. Farrell-
Shapiro (1990)). Our main result here is to characterize a new potential
positive eﬀect of mergers through the reduction of distortion on call exter-
nalities. The merger between the two networks leads to ﬁrm m. This ﬁrm
acts as an unregulated monopoly.
For clarity’s sake, we ﬁrst derive optimal prices for the merger ﬁrm under
the benchmark of complete information and then we introduce asymmetric
information.
4.1 Benchmark
We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case of complete information. The objective
of the merging entity is then to maximize the joint proﬁts
max
pi,pˆi,Fi
Π(pi, pˆi, Fi) = α(π1 + F1 − f1) + (1− α)(π2 + F2 − f2)
s.t. :
vθ1 − F1 ≥ 0 (IR1)
vθ2 − F2 ≥ 0 (IR2)
Note that since this ﬁrm uses two part tariﬀs, this program is the ﬁrst best
solution. Both individual rationality constraints are binding at equilibrium.
The solution of this program is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Under complete information, the merging entity fully internal-
izes call externalities. Usage prices are
pmc1 = c1
pmc2 = c2
pˆmc1 =
(c1+c2)θq1
θq1+θq2
< c1 + c2
pˆmc2 =
(c1+c2)θq2
θq1+θq2
< c1 + c2
Proof. see appendix 3
This ﬁrst best benchmark allows to exhibit optimal prices which internal-
ize perfectly all call externalities. Similarly to the competitive case, on-net
calls are charged at half the marginal cost since the valuation of an on-net
call is the same for the sender and for the receiver. Results are diﬀerent
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for oﬀ-net calls which are valued diﬀerently by sender and receiver as they
are of diﬀerent types and adopt diﬀerent network’s quality. For example
oﬀ-net calls from network 1 to network 2 are valued Uθ1(xθ1(pˆ1)) by the
sender and Uθ2(xθ1(pˆ1)) by the receiver. The externality arising from re-
ceived calls depends on both types θ and θ and both qualities q1 and q2.
Note also that pˆ1 < pˆ2. This is explained by the fact that calls valuation
is higher for consumers θ on network 1 than for consumers on network 2.
Then the externality is larger for calls received by high type consumers.
Note that this ﬁrst best outcome could be achieved by regulating access
charges in a perfect world without asymmetric information. Indeed, compet-
itive on-net prices are optimal since providers use two-part tariﬀ and fully
internalize call externalities for on-net calls. Optimal access charges are thus
implementing ﬁrst best oﬀ-net prices, i.e. pˆd2 (a∗1) = pˆm2 and pˆd1 (a∗1) = pˆm1 ,
which yields to
a∗1 = c1 −
(c1 + c2) θq1
θq1 + θq2
and a∗2 = c2 −
(c1 + c2)

αθ + (1− 2α) θ

q2
(1− α)

θq1 + θq2

Optimal access charges are below marginal cost in order to internalize call ex-
ternalities. This analysis constitutes only a benchmark. Introducing asym-
metric information on costs or demand parameters goes beyond the goal of
this paper.
4.2 Imperfect discrimination
Consider now the more realistic case where the monopoly cannot perfectly
price discriminate between consumers. We show how asymmetric informa-
tion aﬀects the internalization of call externalities. In order to compare it
with the competitive case, we focus only on the case of separating contracts.
As the monopoly uses two part tariﬀs, this problem is the same as the second
best program. Program of the merging entity writes
max
pi e,pi,Fi
α(π1 + F1 − f1) + (1− α)(π2 + F2 − f2)
s.t.
vθ1 ≥ F1 (IR1)
vθ2 ≥ F2 (IR2)
vθ1 − F1 ≥ vθ2 − F2 (IC1)
vθ2 − F2 ≥ vθ1 − F1 (IC2)
This problem is quite similar to a classical adverse selection problem. The
individual rationality constraint of the low type (θ) and the incentive con-
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straint of the high type (θ) will be binding. However, compatibility between
incentives constraints (IC1) and (IC2) requires the following constraint :
vθ1 − vθ1 ≥ vθ2 − vθ2
Using (IR2) and (IC1) , ﬁxed fees are given by
F1 = vθ1 − (vθ2 − vθ2)
F2 = vθ2
The program writes
max
pi e,p
α

π1 + vθ1 − (vθ2 − vθ2)− f1

+ (1− α)(π2 + vθ2 − f2)
s.t. vθ1 − vθ1 ≥ vθ2 − vθ2
In order to compare the two market structures, we limit ourselves to
the case where the constraint is not binding7. We denote λ the Lagrange
multiplier of the compatibility constraint. In the following, we only develop
the particular case where this constraint is not binding (λ = 0) . We refer
the reader to appendix 2 for the general case.
Lemma 4 Under incomplete information, the merger entity fully internal-
izes call externalities. If demand function is not too convex, prices are given
by
(i) pm1 = c1
pm2 =



2(1−α)c2−α(xθ2−xθ2 )/
dxθ2
dp2
2(1−α)−α( θ−θθ )
if α1−α <
2θ
(θ−θ)
+∞ otherwise
pˆm1 =
+
(1−α)θq1
(1−α)(θq1+θq2)−α(θ−θ)q2
(c1 + c2) if
α
1−α <
θq1+θq2
(θ−θ)q2
+∞ otherwise
pˆm2 =
θq2
θq1+θq2

(c1 + c2)−
α
1− α
k
xθ2(ep
m
2 )− xθ2(ep
m
2 )
l
/
dxθ2
(pˆ2)
dpˆ2

(ii) Fm1 and F
m
2 are given by the binding constraints : (IR2) and (IC1)
7The general case with a positive Lagrange multiplier would only increase technical
complications without improving qualitative results.
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Proof : see appendix 3.
Only the on-net calls price on the high quality network is not distorted
by the informational rent. Furthermore, we ﬁnd the standard result of no
distortion at top only for on-net calls for high type. All other prices are
then aﬀected by the informational rent (vθ2 − vθ2) which must be conceded
to type θ.
In order to quantify the direction of this distortion, we show that :
d(vθ2 − vθ2)
dp1
= 0,
d(vθ2 − vθ2)
dpˆ1
< 0
d(vθ2 − vθ2)
dp2
< 0,
d(vθ2 − vθ2)
dpˆ2
< 0
We see that the on-net calls price on network 1 p1 has no eﬀect neither on
utility vθ2 or on vθ2 .Thus this price is not distorted by the informational rent.
In contrast, oﬀ-net calls prices for calling network 2 from network 1 pˆ1 aﬀect
both vθ2 and vθ2 .More precisely, an increase in this price reduces the number
of oﬀ-net calls received on network 2, thus reducing the utility of consumers
adopting this network. An increase in pˆ1 reduces the informational rent
conceded to type θ. The eﬀect is the same for p2 and pˆ2. The three prices
are then higher than under complete information (pˆm1 > pˆ
mc
1 , p
m
2 > p
mc
2 and
pˆm2 > pˆ
mc
2 ).
Note also that the proﬁt of the merger is higher than the sum of the proﬁt
made by competitive networks. This comes from the traditional arguments
of price competition relaxation and of the minimization of the incentive
rent conceded to high type consumers. But it also comes from the full
internalization of all call externalities This gives a new interpretation of the
high bids recently observed in telecommunications mergers. This point has
an important implications for competition policy.
4.3 Welfare analysis
We extend the analysis to address the question of the welfare eﬀects of a
merger between two telecommunications operators. This has been a key
question and remains a relevant policy issue, in light of the recent mergers
wave in the ICT industry. We compare the merger with a totally decen-
tralized market structure where ﬁnal and access prices are chosen freely by
providers.
Mergers are generally analyzed by antitrust authorities under the trade-
oﬀ between the competitive pressure reduction and potential eﬃciency gains.
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The latter are traditionally evaluated in terms of cost reductions. We do not
address this question in this paper. We highlight another source of eﬃciency
gains based on call externalities and better pricing strategy.
The analysis in terms of global welfare is decomposed into two eﬀects.
The ﬁrst eﬀect of our analysis concerns the incentive rent. The merging en-
tity optimizes the informational rent using the three prices pˆ1, pˆ2, p2 whereas
competitive provider 1 can only use one direct instrument pˆ1 and an indirect
tool a1 which inﬂuences pˆ2. The monopoly has then more tools to optimize
the incentive rent. Moreover, even if competitor 1 can inﬂuence pˆ2 through
its access charge a1, he has other goals. The incentive rent is only one the
three objectives when he determines the optimal a1 (the two other objec-
tives are the access revenue and the internalization of call externalities).
The second eﬀect is the perfect internalization of all call externalities by the
merging entity. This enhances the gross utility of subscribers. The following
lemma compares prices in both market structures.
Lemma 5 pd1 = p
m
1 , p
m
2 > p
d
2, pˆ
m
1 < pˆ
d
1

ad2

and pˆm2 < pˆ
d
2

ad1

.
Proof : see appendix 4.
The on-net price p1 is not aﬀected by the merger since the competitive
operator fully internalizes on-net call externalities and this price does not
aﬀect the incentive rent. In contrast, the on-net price on network 2 p2 after
the merger is modiﬁed by the incentive rent let to high type consumers.
This term is measured by −α∂(vθ2−vθ2)∂p2 > 0. We conclude that on-net price
for network 2 is lower in the competitive market structure (pd2 < p
m
2 ).
The comparison for oﬀ-net prices is less direct since it depends on the
level of access charges. The merging entity fully internalizes call externalities
which tends to reduce oﬀ-net prices. It uses the marginal cost as internal
prices for charging access to the other network and uses directly the three
usage prices p1, pˆ1, pˆ2 to balance the incentive rent and the call externalities
eﬀect. Competitive providers also internalize call externalities if they can
choose freely their access charge. But as we saw in the previous section, the
level of their access charge is increased by the double marginalization eﬀect.
Access charges are then chosen at too high a level. This distortion mainly
comes from a lack of instruments in the competitive market structure. Oﬀ-
net prices are then higher in the competitive case (epdi > epmi , i = 1, 2).
19
The following proposition gives the normative implication of a merger
between the two providers.
Proposition 6 (i) Consumers’ net surplus on the low quality network is
not aﬀected by the merger.
(ii) Consumers’ net surplus on the high quality network is increased iﬀ
α
1−α > α˜
(iii) The merger between the two providers increases the global welfare iﬀ
α
1−α > αˆ with 0 < αˆ < α˜.
Proof : see appendix 4.
Consumers on the high quality network send and receive more oﬀ-net
calls after the merger. Their gross surplus vθ1 is then unambiguously in-
creased. However, their net surplus is equal to their incentive rent (vθ2−vθ2).
The merger has to two opposite eﬀects on this incentive rent. On the one
hand, oﬀ-net prices decrease and create an increase in their rent. On the
other hand, the on-net price on the rival’s network increases, which decreases
the incentive rent. The net eﬀect is ambiguous. We show that the former
eﬀect dominates if the proportion of consumers on the high quality network
is high enough. Indeed, the incentive rent for a high type consumer depends
on its traﬃc ﬂow on network 2. The weight of inter networks traﬃc is all
the more important for him since there are many consumers on network 1.
Hence, the decrease of oﬀ-net prices eﬀect dominates if α/ (1− α) is high
enough.
The net surplus of consumers on the low quality network is not aﬀected
by the merger since their individual rationality constraint is binding in both
market structures. However, their gross surplus vθ2 is aﬀected since they
send fewer on-net calls but send and receive more oﬀ-net calls. We can
conduct the same analysis as before and show that the gross surplus is
higher after the merger if α/ (1− α) is high enough. The merger decreases
oﬀ-net prices and then increases inter network traﬃc. This counterbalances
the negative eﬀect of the increase in on-net price p2 if the weight of external
traﬃc is suﬃciently important or if there are enough consumers on the rival’s
network.
Global welfare variation can be written as∆W = ∆π+α∆S1+(1− α)∆S2 =
∆π+α∆S1 since ∆S2 = 0 (Si denotes the surplus of consumers on network
i). Proﬁts are higher under the merger but high type consumer’s surplus
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can be lower. Therefore, the global eﬀect of the merger on total welfare is
ambiguous. The merger increases the global welfare if consumer’s surplus
loss is counterbalanced by proﬁt gains. This is the case if the weight of
inter network traﬃc is suﬃciently high or if the proportion of consumers on
network 1 is high enough.
5 Conclusion
This model shows that providers internalize on-net calls externalities on
their own network, but not oﬀ-net calls. However, by choosing freely its
access charge, a provider internalize incoming oﬀ-net call externalities for its
consumers. Providers can gain by charging low access prices below marginal
cost since it improves their consumers’ utility and allows them to charge
higher ﬁxed fees. However, providers lack instruments and the competitive
level of access charge is too high because of a double marginalization eﬀect.
However, this result contributes to moderating the risk of high access charges
for collusive concerns.
Merging the two telecommunications providers solves the call externali-
ties distortion. We have shown that the merger does not aﬀect the on-net
calls price on the high quality network whereas it increases the on-net calls
price on the low quality network. Oﬀ-net prices in both directions are lower.
The merger then increases inter network traﬃc. It does not aﬀect consumers’
surplus on the low quality network whereas it improves the situation of con-
sumers on the high quality network (and the global welfare) if they are in
high enough proportion.
The lessons drawn from our model would be robust to changes, including
the extension to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers in their demand.
However, aggregating individual demand would lead to technical diﬃculties.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix 1: proof of Proposition 1
Let us ﬁrst write the following properties:
U θi(xθj (p)) =
qi
qj
p (9)
U θi(xθj (p)) =
θ¯qi
θqj
p (10)
U θi(xθ¯j (p)) =
θqi
θ¯qj
p (11)
Here we solve the tariﬀ competition game. A Nash equilibrium duopoly is a vector
of prices

pd1, pˆ
d
1, p
d
2, pˆ
d
2, F
d
1 , F
d
2

for which all consumers θ coordinate on network
1 and all consumers θ on network 2. In other words, at equilibrium, the four
incentive and individual rationality constraints (IR1), (IC1), (IR2), (IC2) have
to be veriﬁed.
F1 ≤ vθ1 (IR1)
F2 ≤ vθ2 (IR2)
F1 ≤ F2 +

vθ1 − vθ2

(IC1)
F1 ≥ F2 +

vθ1 − vθ2

(IC2)
 We ﬁrst derive equilibrium fees F d1 and F
d
2
At equilibrium, unit prices

pd, pˆd

, (IC1) and (IC2) are compatible iﬀ
vθ1 − vθ2

≥

vθ1 − vθ2

or Ψ (p, pˆ) ≥ 0. For a given Fj, provider i would
do well to charge the highest fee Fi which respects (IRi) and (ICi) . Best re-
sponses in fees are thus given by F ∗1 = min

F2 + vθ1 − vθ2 , vθ1

and F ∗2 =
min

F1 +

vθ2 − vθ1

, vθ2

. It is straightforward to see that the unique equilib-
rium fees are given by binding (IC1) and (IR2).
 Now let us derive equilibrium unit prices given equilibrium fees.
Program for ﬁrm 1 writes:
max
{p1,pˆ1}
Π1(p, pˆ) = α
k
π1 + vθ1 − (vθ2 − vθ2)− f1
l
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First order conditions write :
∂Π1
∂p1
= α2[2U θ1(xθ1(p1))− 2c1]
dxθ1(p1)
dp1
= 0
⇔ pd1 = c1 (12)
∂Π1
∂pˆ1
=
q
(1− α)
k
U θ1(xθ1(pˆ1))− (c1 + a2)
l
− α
k
U θ2(xθ1(pˆ1))−U

θ2(xθ1(pˆ1))
lr dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
= 0
Using (9) and (11), this writes:
(1− α)[pˆ1 − (c1 + a2)]− α

q2
q1
pˆ1 −
θq2
θq1
pˆ1

= 0 (13)
or
pˆd1 =
(1− α) θq1 (c1 + a2)
(1− α) θq1 − α(θ − θ)q2
As second order crossed derivatives are zero, second order conditions write ∂
2Π1
∂p21
<
0 and ∂
2Π1
∂ep21
< 0.
∂2Π1
∂p21
= 2
dxθ1(p1)
dp1
+ (2p1 − 2c1)
d2xθ1(p1)
dp21
= 2
dxθ1(p1)
dp1
< 0at equilibrium
∂2Π1
∂ep21
= (1− α)
dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
− α

q2
q1
− θq2
θq1

dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
+

(1− α)[pˆ1 − (c1 + a2)]− α

q2
q1
pˆ1 −
θq2
θq1
pˆ1

d2xθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ21
= (1− α)
dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
− α

q2
q1
− θq2
θq1

dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
at equilibrium
∂2Π1
∂ep21
< 0⇔ α
1− α <
θq1
(θ − θ)q2
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Program for ﬁrm 2 writes
max
{p2,pˆ2}
Π2(p2, pˆ2, F2) = (1− α)

π2 + vθ2 − f2

First order conditions write :
∂Π2
∂p2
= (1− α)2[2U θ2(xθ2(p2))− 2c2]
dxθ2(p2)
dp2
= 0
⇔ pd2 = c2
∂Π2
∂ep2
= α(1− α)[U θ2(xθ2(ep2))− (a1 + c2)]
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
= 0
Using (9) and (10), this writes:
α(1− α)[ep2 − (a1 + c2)]
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
= 0
We derive
pˆd2 = c2 + a1
Second order conditions write
∂2Π2
∂p22
= 2
dxθ2(p2)
dp2
+ (2p2 − 2c2)
d2xθ2(p2)
dp22
= 2
dxθ2(p2)
dp2
< 0at equilibrium
∂2Π2
∂ep22
=
dxθ2(pˆ2)
dpˆ2
+ (pˆ2 − (c2 + a1))
d2xθ2(pˆ2)
dpˆ22
=
dxθ2(pˆ2)
dpˆ2
< 0at equilibrium
 We now show that this equilibrium candidate is the unique duopoly equilib-
rium. Let us assume that (p∗, pˆ∗) is a unit price equilibrium such that the
four constraints (IR1), (IC1), (IR2), (IC2) are compatible orΨ (p∗, pˆ∗) <
0. We know from the previous result that the unique equilibrium fees are
such that (IC2) and (IR1) are binding. But the best response to those
equilibrium fees are

pd, pˆd

. We conclude that if Ψ (p∗, pˆ∗) ≥ 0, then
pd, pˆd, F d1 , F
d
2

is the unique duopoly equilibrium. Otherwise, there does
not exist any duopoly equilibrium.
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6.2 Appendix 2 : proof of proposition 2
The global proﬁt of operator 1 is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing with respect
to a1. Let us write the derivative for a1 close to the marginal cost:
∂Π1
∂a1

a1=c1
= (1− α)xθ2 + α(xθ2 − xθ2) + (1− α) (c2 + c1)
θq1
θq2
dxθ2
dep2
Three eﬀects can be set out. The ﬁrst two are positive and respectively aﬀect the
access revenue and the incentive rent. The last is negative and represents the call
externalities eﬀect. The optimal access charge is above marginal cost iﬀ
α
1− α >
xθ2
(xθ2 − xθ2)
%
θq1
θq2
1
ξxθ2
− 1
&
= α
We now compute the derivative of the global proﬁt of provider 2 close to the
marginal cost c2.
∂Π2
∂a2

a2=c2
= αxθ1 + α
θq2
θq1
ep1
dxθ1
dep1
dep1
da2
> 0
⇔ α
1− α <
θq1
θq2
− ξx
θ1
 θ
θ − θ
 = α
Note that

θq1
θq2 − ξxθ1

θ
(θ−θ) <
θq1
(θ−θ)q2
.
6.3 Appendix 3 : proof of lemma 3 and 4
6.3.1 Proof of lemma 3
The ﬁrst best program under complete information writes
max
pi,pˆi,Fi
Π(pi, pˆi, Fi) = α(π1 + F1 − f1) + (1− α)(π2 + F2 − f2)
s.t. :
vθ1 − F1 ≥ 0 (IR1)
vθ2 − F2 ≥ 0 (IR2)
Both individual rationality constraints are binding.
First order conditions write:
∂Πm
∂p1
= α2[2U θ1(xθ1(p1))− 2c1]
dxθ1(p1)
dp1
= 0
∂Πm
∂p2
= (1− α)2[2U θ2(xθ2(p2))− 2c2]
dxθ2(p2)
dp2
= 0
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which writes using (9)
pmc1 = c1
pmc2 = c2
∂Πm
∂pˆ1
= α(1− α)[U θ1(xθ1(pˆ1)) + U

θ2
(xθ1(pˆ1))− (c1 + c2)]
dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
= 0
Using (9) and (11), this writes:
α(1− α)[pˆ1 +
θq2
θq1
pˆ1 − (c1 + c2)]
dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
= 0
We derive
pˆmc1 =
(c1 + c2)θq1
θq1 + θq2
< c1 + c2
∂Πm
∂ep2
= α(1− α)[U θ2(xθ2(ep2)) + U

θ1(xθ2(ep2))− (c1 + c2)]
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
= 0
Using (9) and (10), this writes:
α(1− α)[ep2 +
θq1
θq2
ep2 − (c1 + c2)]
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
= 0
We derive
pˆmc2 =
(c1 + c2)θq2
θq1 + θq2
< c1+c2
As second order crossed derivatives are zero, second order conditions write
∂2Πm
∂p2i
< 0 and ∂
2Πm
∂pˆ2j
< 0, i, j = 1, 2:
∂2Πm
∂p2i
= α2[(2pi − 2ci)
d2xθi(pi)
dp2i
+ 2
dxθi(pi)
dpi
] = 2
dxθi(pi)
dpi
< 0
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∂2Πm
∂ep22
= α(1− α)[ep2 +
θq1
θq2
ep2 − (c1 + c2)]
d2xθ2(ep2)
dep22
+ α(1− α)θq1 + θq2θq2
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
= α(1− α)θq1 + θq2θq2
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
< 0
and
∂2Πm
∂pˆ21
= α(1− α)[pˆ1 +
θq2
θq1
pˆ1 − (c1 + c2)]
d2xθ1(pˆ1)
dp21
+ [
θq1 + θq2
θq1
]
dxθ1(pˆ1)
dp1
= [
θq1 + θq2
θq1
]
dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
< 0
6.3.2 Proof of lemma 4
The second best program under asymmetric information writes
max
pi,epi
α

π1 + vθ1 − (vθ2 − vθ2)− f1

+ (1− α)(π2 + vθ2 − f2)
s.t. vθ1 − vθ1 ≥ vθ2 − vθ2
(14)
First order conditions write :
∂Πm
∂p1
= α2
k
2U θ1(xθ1(p1))− 2c1
l dxθ1(p1)
dp1
= 0
⇔ pm1 = c1 (15)
∂Πm
∂pˆ1 = {(1− α)
k
U θ1(xθ1(pˆ1)) + U

θ2
(xθ1(pˆ1))− (c1 + c2)
l
−α
k
U θ2(xθ1(pˆ1))− U

θ2(xθ1(pˆ1))
l
}
dxθ1
(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
= 0
Using (9) and (11), this writes:
(1− α)[pˆ1 +
θq2
θq1
pˆ1 − (c1 + c2)]− α

q2
q1
pˆ1 −
θq2
θq1
pˆ1

= 0 (16)
We derive
pˆm1 =
(1− α) θq1 (c1 + c2)
(1− α)(θq1 + θq2)− α(θ − θ)q2
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∂Πm
∂p2 = (1− α)
2[2U θ2
(xθ2(p2))− 2c2]
dxθ2
(p2)
dp2
−α(1− α)

U θ2(xθ2(p2))− p2

dxθ2
(p2)
dp2
− xθ2 (p2)

−α(1− α)

U θ2(xθ2(p2))− 2U

θ2
(xθ2(p2)) + p2

)
dxθ2
(p2)
dp2
+ xθ2(p2)

= 0
Using (9) and (10), this writes:
(1− α)[2p2 − 2c2]
dxθ2
(p2)
dp2
− α

−xθ2(p2) +

θ¯
θp2 − 2p2 + p2
 dxθ2 (p2)
dp2
+ xθ2(p2)

= 0
⇔ p2
dxθ2
(p2)
dp2
k
2(1− α)− α (θ¯−θ)θ
l
= 2c2(1− α)
dxθ2
(p2)
dp2
− α

xθ2
(p2)− xθ2(p2)

or
pm2 =
2(1− α)c2 − α(xθ2 − xθ2)
1
dxθ2
dp2
2(1− α)− α( θ−θθ )
∂Πm
∂pˆ2 = α(1− α)
k
U θ2
(xθ2(ep2)) +U

θ1
(xθ2(ep2))− (c1 + c2)
l dxθ2 (ep2)
dep2
−α2

U θ2(xθ2(ep2))− ep2
 dxθ2 (ep2)
dep2 − xθ2(ep2)−

U θ2
(xθ2(ep2))− ep2
 dxθ2(ep2)
dep2 + xθ2(ep2)

= 0
Using (9) and (10), this writes:
(1− α)
k
ep2 + θ¯q1θq2 ep2 − (c1 + c2)
l dxθ2 (ep2)
dep2 + α
k
xθ2(ep2)− xθ2(ep2)
l
= 0
⇔ epm2 (1− α)

θ¯q1+θq2
θq2

= (1− α)(c1 + c2)− α
k
xθ2(ep2)− xθ2(ep2)
l
1
dxθ2
(ep2)
dep2
As second order crossed derivatives are zero, second order conditions write ∂
2Π1
∂p2
i
<
0 and ∂
2Π1
∂ep2
i
< 0, i = 1, 2.
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∂2Π1
∂p21
= 2
dxθ1(p1)
dp1
+ (2p1 − 2c1)
d2xθ1(p1)
dp21
= 2
dxθ1(p1)
dp1
< 0using (15)
∂2Π1
∂ep21
=

(1− α)θq1 + θq2
θq1
− α(θ − θ)q2
θq1

dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
+

(1− α)[pˆ1 +
θq2
θq1
pˆ1 − (c1 + c2)]− α

q2
q1
pˆ1 −
θq2
θq1
pˆ1

d2xθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ21
=

(1− α)θq1 + θq2
θq1
− α(θ − θ)q2
θq1

dxθ1(pˆ1)
dpˆ1
using (16)
∂2Π1
∂ep21
< 0⇔ α
1− α <
θq1 + θq2
(θ − θ)q2
Note that this condition is the same than the one which guarantees that pˆm1 > 0.
∂2Πm
∂p22
=

2(1− α)− αθθ

dxθ2(p2)
dp2
+
d2xθ2(p2)
dp22

α(xθ2(p2)− xθ2(p2))

dxθ2(p2)/dp2
+ α
dxθ2(p2)
dp2
< 0
which can be written close to pm2
#
d2xθ2(p
m
2 )
dp22
$
/
#
−
dxθ2(p
m
2 )
dp2
$
<
−

2(1− α)− αθθ

dxθ2(p
m
2 )
dp2
− α
dxθ2(p
m
2 )
dp2
α(xθ2(p
m
2 )− xθ2(p
m
2 ))
(17)
Proﬁt is then locally concave with respect to p2 iﬀ demand is not too convex.
The second order condition for ep2 writes
∂2Πm
∂ep22
=
(1− α)
 θ¯q1 + θq2
θq2
ep2 − (c1 + c2)

d2xθ2(ep2)
dep22
+

(1− α) θ¯q1 + θq2θq2
− α

dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
+α
dxθ2(ep2)
dep2
< 0
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which can be rewritten at the neighboring of epm2
#
d2xθ2(ep
m
2 )
dep22
$
/
#
−
dxθ2(ep
m
2 )
dep2
$
<

(1− α) θ¯q1 + θq2θq2
− α
#
−
dxθ2(ep
m
2 )
dep2
$
− α
dxθ2(ep
m
2 )
dep2
α(xθ2(ep
m
2 )− xθ2(ep
m
2 ))
(18)
As previously, this condition can be interpreted in terms of curvature of the demand
function xθ2 . Proﬁt is locally concave iﬀ the demand function is not too convex.
Otherwise, the monopoly charges ep2 = +∞.
6.4 Appendix 4. Proof of lemma and proposition 5
6.4.1 Proof of lemma 5
 epm1 < epd1

ad2

epd1 (a2) =
(1− α) θq1
(1− α) θq1 − α(θ − θ)q2
(c1 + a2)
pˆm1 =
(1− α)θq1(c1 + c2)
(1− α)(θq1 + θq2)− α(θ − θ)q2
epm1 < epd1

ad2

⇔ ad2 > a2 = c2 −
(1− α)θq2(c1 + c2)
(1− α)(θq1 + θq2)− α(θ − θ)q2
In order to compare the position of a2 with respect to a
d
2, we compute
∂Πd2
∂a2

a2=a2
= αxθ1 + α(a2 − c2)
dxθ1
dep1
depd1
da2
+ αθq2
θq1
epd1 (a2)
dxθ1
dep1
depd1
da2
At the point a2 = a2, epd1(a2) = epm1 . We obtain
∂Πd2
∂a2

a2=a2
= αxθ1 + α

− (1− α)θq2(c1 + c2)
(1− α)(θq1 + θq2)− α(θ − θ)q2
 dxθ1
dep1
depd1
da2
+αθq2
θq1
(1− α)θq1(c1 + c2)
(1− α)(θq1 + θq2)− α(θ − θ)q2
dxθ1
dep1
depd1
da2
= αxθ1 > 0
We conclude that ad2 > a2 and then epm1 < epd1
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 epm2 < epd2
epd2 (a1) = c2 + a1
pˆm2 =
θq2
θq1 + θq2

(c1 + c2)−
α
1− α

xθ2(ep
m
2 )− xθ2(ep
m
2 )
 1
dxθ2
(epm2 )
dep2


epm2 < epd2

ad1

⇔
ad1 > a1 = c1 −
θq1
θq1 + θq2
(c1 + c2)−
α
1− α
θq2
θq1 + θq2
k
xθ2(ep
m
2 )− xθ2(ep
m
2 )
l 1
dxθ2
(epm2 )
dep2
In order to compare ad1 and a1 we compute
∂Π1
∂a1

a1=a1
∂Π1
∂a1
= (1− α)xθ2

epd2 (a1)

+ (1− α)(a1 − c1)
dxθ2

epd2

dep2
depd2
da1
+α
k
xθ2

epd2 (a1)

− xθ2

epd2 (a1)
l dxθ2

epd2

dep2
depd2
da1
+ (1− α)θq1θq2
epd2 (a1)
dxθ2

epd2

dep2
depd2
da1
with
depd2
da1
= 1. At the point a1 = a1, we have epd2 (a1) = epm2 or a1 = epm2 − c2.
∂Π1
∂a1

a1=a1
= (1− α)xθ2 (ep
m
2 ) + α(xθ2 (ep
m
2 )− xθ2 (ep
m
2 ))
dxθ2 (ep
m
2 )
dep2
+(1− α)
dxθ2 (ep
m
2 )
dep2

epm2 − c2 − c1 +
θq1
θq2
epm2

= (1− α)xθ2 (epm2 ) + α(xθ2 (ep
m
2 )− xθ2 (epm2 ))
dxθ2 (ep
m
2 )
dep2
+(1− α)
dxθ2 (ep
m
2 )
dep2
θq1 + θq2
θq2
epm2 − (c2 + c1)

= (1− α)xθ2 (ep
m
2 ) + α(xθ2 (ep
m
2 )− xθ2 (ep
m
2 ))
dxθ2 (ep
m
2 )
dep2
−α

xθ2(ep
m
2 )− xθ2(ep
m
2 )
 dxθ2 (ep
m
2 )
dep2
= (1− α)xθ2 (ep
m
2 ) > 0
We conclude that epm2 < epd2.
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6.4.2 Proof of proposition 6
(i) The incentive rent vθ2 − vθ2 writes
vθ2 − vθ2 = (1− α)A1 (p2) + αA2 (ep2) + αA3 (pˆ1)
with
A1 (p2) = [Uθ2(xθ2(p2)) + Uθ2(xθ2(p2))− p2xθ2(p2)]− [Uθ2(xθ2(p2))− p2xθ2(p2) + Uθ2(xθ2(p2))]
A2(ep2) = [Uθ2(xθ2(ep2))− ep2xθ2(ep2)]− [Uθ2(xθ2(pˆ2))− pˆ2xθ2(pˆ2)]
A3 (ep1) = Uθ2(xθ1(ep1))− Uθ2(xθ1(pˆ1))
We denote ∆Aj (p) = Aj (pm) − Aj

pd

, j = 1, .2, 3 which is a decreasing
function with respect to p.
The incentive rent is higher after the merger iﬀ
α
1− α >
−∆A1(p2)
∆A2 (ep2) +∆A3 (pˆ1)
= α˜
Since pm2 > p
d
2, epm1 < epd1 and epm2 < epd2, we have ∆A1(p2) < 0, ∆A2(ep2) > 0,
∆A3 (pˆ1) > 0 and then α˜ > 0.
(ii)
∆W = α2∆B1 (p1) + (1− α)2∆B2 (p2) + α(1− α)∆B3(pˆ1) + α(1− α)∆B4(pˆ2)
with
B1 (p1) = [2Uθ1(xθ1(p1))− 2c1xθ1(p1)]
B2 (p2) = [2Uθ2(xθ2(p2))− 2c2xθ2(p2)]
B3(pˆ1) = [Uθ1(xθ1(pˆ1)) + Uθ2(xθ1(pˆ1))− (c1 + c2)xθ1(pˆ1)]
B4(pˆ2) = [Uθ2(xθ2(pˆ2)) + Uθ1(xθ2(pˆ2))− (c1 + c2)xθ2(pˆ2)]
∆Bj (p) = Bj (pm)−Bj

pd

, j = 1, ..., 4
∆Bj (p) is a decreasing function with respect to p.
Since pm1 = p
d
1, p
m
2 > p
d
2, epm1 < epd1 and epm2 < epd2, we have ∆B1(p1) = 0,
∆B2(p2) < 0, ∆B3(ep1) > 0, ∆B4 (pˆ2) > 0.
We deduce that
∆W > 0⇔ α
1− α >
−∆B2 (p2)
∆B3(pˆ1) +∆B4(pˆ2)
= αˆ > 0
Since for α1−α = α˜, ∆W > 0 it is straightforward that 0 < αˆ < α˜.
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